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DECIPHERING THE IRANIAN PARADOX - 
IT’S NOT LEFT WING, IT’S NOT RIGHT WING, IT’S 
THE RIGHT THING: 
NO ENGAGEMENT, NO WAR, THE TIME HAS COME 
TO SUPPORT THE WILL OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE
MORA NAMDAR*
The paradox of  Iran is a struggle in every sense of  the word and for every possible party in-
volved. There remains a continuous struggle for the regime to keep hold pitted against a constant 
battle for the people to achieve self-determination.1  Some commentators argue that the regime in 
Iran is there for the foreseeable future and that it is in the interests of  the United States to negotiate; 
others argue that this idea is premised on a total fallacy and that the current regime is unsustainable. 
Whichever argument is correct, the United States cannot ignore Iran’s past by blindly agreeing that 
any kind of  support for the Iranian people’s quest for democracy is pro-war demagoguery; if  it does, 
the United States stands to lose far more than just the nuclear issue. Iran’s conduct regarding its nu-
clear program and its numerous violations of  human rights warrant pressure from the United States 
and other democracies to support a foreign policy that will encompass the will of  Iran’s own people 
for regime change from  religious theocracy to a secular democracy. For this strategy to be effective, 
there must be a harmonized effort by the international community to impose smart sanctions and 
other non-violent tools to force the Iranian regime to succumb to the will of  its own people. It was 
synchronized efforts such as these that succeeded in bringing an end to apartheid in South Africa. 
 Advocates of  a so-called “Grand Bargain” maintain that engagement with the Iranian regime 
is the way to produce results and suggest that the international community offer to lift sanctions 
*      Mora Namdar is a 2011 JD/MA candidate at American University – Washington College of  Law.  For her 
International Affairs studies she is concentrating on the Middle East, human rights, and energy issues.  She speaks Farsi 
and earned her Bachelor degrees in Political Science and International Studies of  the Middle East along with minors in 
Philosophy, Fine Art, and Human Rights from Southern Methodist University.  
1  See Amir Taheri, The Fight for Iran’s Future Is Far from Over, Times, June 30, 2009, available at http://www.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6605062.ece (describing the ongoing struggle between the 
people and the government for the future of  Iran). 
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and make assurances that the United States would not support regime change. The United States 
has attempted this numerous times without success.2 In the same way that “constructive engage-
ment” failed in bringing an end to Apartheid in South Africa, engagement with Iran has also resulted 
in failure.3 It was only when a bipartisan effort by Democrats and Republicans overrode President 
Reagan’s veto, sanctioning and pressuring South Africa (with set preconditions to lift the sanctions) 
through the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of  1986; this effort was vital to ending apartheid 
in South Africa.4 Several past administrations have attempted negotiating with the Iranian regime.5 
Instead of  accepting the overtures of  the United States and other UN member nations to negotiate, 
Iran has employed methods of  stalling or ignoring UN resolutions and has mirrored the path North 
Korea pursued in acquiring nuclear weapons.6  By mimicking the methods used by the now-nuclear 
North Korea, the Iranian regime has ignored UN Security Council resolutions regarding the Iranian 
nuclear program forcing the UN Security Council to resort to sanctions.7 Currently, Iran is closer 
than ever to acquiring nuclear weapons capability, and reports indicate that with 20% enriched ura-
nium, it could take Iran a year or less to build a nuclear weapon.8 Clearly, the rise of  a nuclear Iran is 
an ever present concern not only for the national security of  the United States but to the countries 
who have agreed to non-proliferation policies.  
 Understanding the historical context of  the Iranian condition is integral to successfully maneu-
vering the future. The past century in Iran has seen a constant thrust by the people to move toward 
democracy, whether through parliamentary measures, the election of  Mohammed Mossadegh, or 
the ousting of  the Shah.  The classic example is that of  the election of  Mohammed Mossadegh in 
2  See Bruce Riedel, America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers, 25 BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF. 1, 101 (2008), available at  http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa15&div=12&g_
sent=1&collection=journals (discussing failed policies based on fl awed analysis, as implemented by the United States 
government in dealing with the Iranian regime). 
3  See Sanford J. Ungar & Peter Vale, South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 234 (1985), 
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/40525/sanford-j-ungar-and-peter-vale/south-africa-why-constructive-
engagement-failed (describing the implementation and failure of  constructive engagement in South Africa to bring about 
an end to apartheid). 
4  See African-American—South Africa Project, African American Historical Linkages with South Africa, Howard University, 
available at http://www.howard.edu/library/Reference/bob_edgar_site/about.html (describing the process by which the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of  1986 brought about the pressure needed to force an end to apartheid in South 
Africa). 
5  See Lara Rozen, Declassifi ed Documents Revisit Secret U.S. Overture to Iran, POLITICO, May 30, 2010, available at http://
www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0510/Declassifi ed_documents_revisit_secret_US_overture_to_Iran.html 
(describing the attempts and overtures of  numerous past U.S. presidential administrations in trying to negotiate with the 
Iranian regime and the failure of  this dialogue in bringing about any sort of  change in U.S.-Iran relations). 
6  See Associated Press, Iran Stays Silent on U.S. Offer of  Dialogue, MSNBC.COM (August 8, 2009), http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/32194136/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/38285299 (giving an account of  the response by the Iranian 
regime after U.S. overtures for engagement and dialogue). 
7  See Yuriy Humber & Ladane Nasseri, Iran Ignores Sanctions, Start First Nuclear Plant, BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 21, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-08-21/iran-ignores-sanctions-start-fi rst-nuclear-plant.html.
8  See Nasser Karimi, Iran’s Leader Orders Further Enrichment of  Uranium, GUARDIAN.COM (Feb. 7, 2010),  http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8934697 (describing the Iranian response to the U.N. Security Council resolutions and 
subsequent sanctions). 
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the 1950s. The Iranian people had been demanding a democratic voice for some time, and slowly 
the Shah was accommodating their demands by allowing for the democratic election of  a Prime 
Minister. After Mossadegh was elected, he nationalized Iran’s oil (which had been solely in the 
hands of  Britain in the form of  the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company – what is now known as BP9). Not 
long thereafter, a plan was created and implemented to oust Mossadegh in a coup d’état in order 
to reinstate the Shah.10 The Iranian people’s frustration and hopes for democracy smoldered and 
built for another 27 years until the 1979 revolution. The fall of  the Shah in 1979 occurred amidst 
street protests, merchant strikes, and burning oil fi elds. In a sweeping move, the loudest faction took 
control of  the movement under Ayatollah Khomeini.  Commentators now widely see the resulting 
theocracy as far more oppressive than the Shah’s regime. Now, more than 30 years later, an uprising 
is fomenting again.
 It is logical to ascertain that it would be in the best interest of  not only the Iranian people but 
the United States to support regime change in Iran.11 Those who opposed supporting the will of  the 
Iranian people for regime change in Iran maintained that if  the United States showed support for 
the Green Movement or made a stronger statement on the widely contested elections of  2009, the 
regime would once again externalize confl ict and point to the United States and the United King-
dom as fomenting a coup d’état or “velvet revolution” to oust the regime. Heeding that advice, the 
United States stayed silent in the face of  gross human rights abuses, such as the shooting death of  
Neda Agha-Soltan by a government assassin, because the United States hoped to build trust on the 
nuclear issue.12 What was the Iranian regime’s response? The Iranian regime placed blame for the 
street protests and opposition on the United States and United Kingdom anyway.13 In addition, the 
Iranian theocracy continued to move forward with the enrichment of  uranium and continued to 
9  See Ishaan Tharoor, A Brief  History of  BP, TIME, June 2, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1993361,00.html (showing the history of  the British and the Anglo-Iranian oil company in Iran and the 
power these oil companies wielded in the country at that time). 
10  DONALD WILBER, OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN CS HISTORICAL PAPER NO. 208 (1954), reprinted in 
James Risen, Secrets of  History:  The C.I.A. in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/#documents (presenting declassifi ed government documents accounting the planning and 
execution of  the plan to overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in order to reinstate the Shah 
by then-CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt).  
11  See Richard Haass, Enough Is Enough: Why we can no longer remain on the sidelines in the struggle for regime change in Iran, 
Newsweek, January 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/21/enough-is-enough.html (detailing the need for a new response to the 
Iranian regime and the necessity to support the Green Movement rather than continue to silently allow for overtures at 
engagement to be ignored). 
12  See David Blair, Iran Election: Barack Obama Refuses to ‘Meddle’ Over Protests, TELEGRAPH, June 17, 2009, available 
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/5556155/Iran-election-Barack-Obama-refuses-
to-meddle-over-protests.html (showing the Obama administrations response and silence to the widespread protests 
following the elections scandal of  the summer of  2009 in Iran).
13  Iran: Government Alleges CIA Behind Street Protests, ADNKRONOSINTERNATIONAL.com (June 24, 2009), http://www.
adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Politics/?id=3.0.3462950540 (detailing the attempts of  the Iranian regime to blame the 
unrest on the United States and the CIA).  
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ignore UN resolutions.14  
The election scandal of  June 2009 showed what was happening inside Iran, despite the govern-
ment’s attempts to block the entry of  foreign reporters into the country, close domestic newspapers, 
slow internet connections, and disrupt cell phone service.15 The government’s widespread attempts 
at propaganda, such as busing in destitute villagers with promises of  food and payments of  cash to 
attend state sponsored rallies in support of  Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, did not equal anywhere near 
the massive number of  supporters that came out in the streets to protest in support of  the Green 
Movement.16
It is important to note that while the Green Movement has many factions, there is no clear 
“true” Green Movement leader or voice, though many have tried to claim the mantle.17 Mir-Hossein 
Mousavi himself  has stated that the movement carried him, he did not carry the movement.18 It 
soon became apparent that the sentiment of  the opposition became an overall rejection of  the the-
ocracy in power.19  While the widespread sentiment is that the Iranian people want a secular govern-
ment in Iran which respects basic human rights, this message is masked because those who openly 
14  See INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA & Iran: Chronology of  Key Events, IAEA.GOV, http://www.iaea.org/
NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline7.shtml (providing a chronology of  key events occurring throughout the 
relationship between Iran and the IAEA) (last visited Sept. 24, 2010); see also Background Note: Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE  
(July 23, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm (accounting for the history of  the region that is now 
Iran, from the Persian Empire to modern Iran’s more recent struggles with the United States and the International 
community)
15  See Mehdi Khalaji, Khamenei’s Coup, Washington Post, June 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR2009061401758.html?hpid=topnews (detailing the Iranian regime, under 
Khamenei’s reaction to the election scandal of  the summer of  2009); see also Iranian Newspaper Raided, Employees Detained, 
Committee to Protect Journalist, June 23, 2009, available at  http://cpj.org/2009/06/iranian-newspaper-raided-25-
employ.ees-detained.php (showing an example of  the violent and fervent repression of  speech by the Iranian regime 
against the Green Movement opposition), David Blair, Iran Struggles to Censor News Of  Protests, Telegraph, June 15, 2009, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/5543145/Iran-struggles-to-censor-news-of-
protests.html (showing the widespread and extreme measures that the Iranian regime employs to silence and counter the 
Green Movement opposition)
16  See Toofanbanned. 15th June 2009 Millions Protest in Iran Against Election Fraud in Iran, YOUTUBE.COM (June 15, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ey9Kgf-cB40 (showing a video of  the massive crowd protesting the Iranian regime 
and the election scandal); see also Matthew Weaver, Iran Protests, Guardian, February 11, 2010, available at  http://www.
guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2010/feb/11/iran-protests-22-bahman (accounting the details, large numbers, and violent 
opposition by the Iranian regime against the Green movement protests of  22 Bahman).
17  See Mehdi Khalaji, Who’s Really Running Iran’s Green Movement, FOREIGN POL’Y, November 4, 2009, available at http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/04/whos_really_running_irans_green_movement (showing that there are 
many different elements and factions that make up the Green Movement and that there is no true leader of  the Green 
Movement). 
18  See Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Man in the News: Mir Hussein Mousavi, January 8 2010, available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
a9a43a22-fc91-11de- bc51-00144feab49a.html (citing Mousavi in stating that he is not the leader of  the movement but 
that the movement carried him). 
19 See New Momentum-but No Clear Goal- for Iran’s Street Protests, TIME.COM (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,1915599,00.html (revealing the evolution of  the Green Movement opposition from a “where is my 
vote?” issue to a broader desire to change the system of  government in power). 
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say this are then targeted by the government.20 Mousavi’s own nephew was shot and killed outside 
his home in Tehran.21  One of  Iran’s most respected and senior clerics, Ayatollah Sayed Hossein Ka-
zemeyni Boroujerdi, who advocates separation of  religion and government, has been put into prison 
under brutal conditions for expressing his views.22 Heshmat Tabarzadi is also a leading freedom 
activist who advocates the separation of  religion and government as well as adherence to a constitu-
tion based on the UN Declaration of  Human Rights. Mr. Tabarzadi had already spent nine years in 
Evin prison following the 1999 uprising; after expressing his views in 2009 in the Wall Street Journal, 
he has again been arrested and is currently in prison.23
Encouraging the United States to stay out of  the internal confl ict with the Iranian elections, to 
avoid enabling the regime to blame the United States for the internal strife, can now be seen as poor 
advice.24 Massive numbers of  Iranian people took to the streets, in videos still available on websites 
like Youtube, with chants in Farsi of  “Obama; you’re either with us or with them.”25 This call to 
U.S. leaders to take a fi rm side with either the Iranian regime or the Iranian people was met with a 
deafening silence that produced no gains for U.S. interests.26 The United States must tread with cau-
tion; it is fi scally and politically undesirable to enter into another war, yet it is also unacceptable to 
continue standing by the sidelines.
Ultimately, it was shown that the reformers within the theocracy were not able to bring about the 
changes that the Iranian people wanted.  The reformists, like Mohammed Khatami, were unable to 
change the system, because the hardliners, such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would not allow 
20  Associated Press, Khamenei: Reformers Face “Harsh Response”: Iran’s Supreme Leader Warns Opposition Against Confronting 
Regime, CBS.COM (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/11/world/main5302751.shtml (showing 
the overt warning of  Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, that those who oppose the regime will be met with violent 
opposition and harsh consequences). 
21  See Robert F. Worth, Police are Said to Have Killed 10 in Street Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/world/middleeast/28iran.html?_r=2&hp (discussing the death of  Moussavi’s nephew 
outside his home). 
22  Urgent Action Appeal:  Ayatollah Sayed Hossein Kazemeyni Boroujerdi, NEWSL. (AMNESTY INT’L USA, N.Y.) Aug. 10, 2007, 
available at http://www.iranrights.org/english/document-298-699.php (detailing the arrest of  and harsh treatment of  
Ayatollah Boroujerdi). 
23  Heshmat Tabarzadi, What I see on the Frontline in Iran: Regime Change is Now Our Movements Rallying 
Cry, WALL ST. J., December 17, 2009, available at  http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:
SB10001424052748704869304574595812267746876.html (publishing the article for which Heshmat Tabarzadi was put 
into prison for writing). 
24  See Richard N. Haass, Enough Is Enough: Why We Can No Longer Remain on the Sidelines in the Struggle for Regime Change 
in Iran, NEWSWEEK, January 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/21/enough-is-enough.html (detailing the need for a new response to the Iranian 
regime and the necessity of  supporting the Green Movement rather than continuing to continue silently tolerating 
overtures of  engagement to be ignored). 
25  REUTERSVIDEO. Iran Demonstrators’ “Obama” Chant, YOUTUBE.COM (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_4CtKx7hCMg (showing large crowds of  Iranian people clearly chanting “Obama yah bah mah yah bah una” 
which means “Obama, your either with us or with them” in Farsi).
26  Haas, supra note 27.
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it.27 As it has become apparent, the system in Iran will not allow change from within. And, the push 
for a  non-violent referendum, like that which removed Augusto Pinochet in Chile, has been advo-
cated as the best option by many groups.28 Rather than allowing a derivative of  the Islamic Republic 
to take hold under the guise of  real change, it is critical for the United States to support the secular 
coalition of  the willing who demand democracy based on the separation of  religion from govern-
ment and a constitution which is founded on the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights.   
The idea that the current Iranian regime is here to stay and can be reformed through engage-
ment is based on erroneous historical analogies.29 The comparison made between President Nixon’s 
openings of  relations with China during the Cold War with the possibility of  the United States 
opening relations with Iran today is misleading. An Iran under an Islamic theocracy does not have 
the ability or potential to manufacture nor does it have the openness to capitalism that the Chinese 
had.   Additionally, attempts at opening up relations with Iran after the uprising of  the Green Move-
ment would not only hurt American credibility on the human rights front but would create disdain 
similar to the betrayal felt by Iranians during the 1953 coup d’état that ousted Mossadegh.30 Support 
for the Iranian regime today would be viewed by Iranians as another blow to Iranian hopes for de-
mocracy. The best option for the United States is to support the Iranian people’s desires for a secular 
democratic government through the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with its P5+1 
alliance, by passing a resolution that demands the referendum that the Iranian people have called 
for in parallel with imposing strict targeted sanctions until such time as such a referendum comes to 
fruition.31
In any historically successful uprising in Iran, certain key elements have been present. These 
elements include widespread street protests, strikes by merchants, and the unifi cation of  factions 
against the current regime in power.32 Recently, street protests have already taken place, despite the 
brutal suppression of  the regime. The people have unifi ed into an overarching “Green Movement.” 
27 See Jim Muir, Iran’s Reformists Warn of  Dictatorship, BBC, July 17, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/2134063.stm (explaining the inability of  the regime to change from within since the Supreme Leader 
functions as the equivalent of  a de facto dictator); see also Is Reform Possible in Iran?, BBC, June 14, 2001, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/1367285.stm (discussion of  the obstacles to reform within the Iranian regime).
28  Background Note: Chile, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1981.htm (detailing 
Chilean history, including the non-violent referendum, in which the people voted Augusto Pinochet out of  power in 
what amounted to a bloodless revolution by voting “no” on the ballot). 
29  See Eli Lake, Iran Protestors Alter Tactics to Avoid Death, WASH. TIMES, June 25, 2009 available at http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/25/opposition-alters-tactics-to-avoid-protest-deaths/?page=1 (accounting the 
resilience of  the Green Movement and the ability of  the opposition to change their tactics in order to save their own 
lives while still working to counter the Iranian regime).  
30  WILBER, supra note 12.
31  See Abbas Milani, A Coup in Three Steps:  The U.S. Must Side With Iran’s People, FORBES, June 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/15/iran-elections-khamenei-mousavi-ahmadinejad-opinions-contributors-milani.html 
(arguing that it is necessary that the United States side with the Iranian people and employ different methods of  exerting 
pressure on the Iranian regime). 
32  See Robin Wright, Iran’s Protestors:  Phase 2 of  Their Feisty Campaign, TIME, July 27, 2009, available at http://www.time.
com/time/world/article/0,8599,1912941,00.html?xid=rss-world (showing the process in which the opposition takes 
certain steps in order to push for their desired regime change). 
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And, only now, due to long overdue sanctions, the regime is becoming pressed for money.33 Because 
there is no income tax in Iran and most revenue comes from oil and exports, the regime has been 
pinched by the new round of  sanctions. This has forced the regime to begin taxing the merchants at 
rates up to 30%. The merchants have now in turn begun to strike. It took one full year for the revo-
lution in 1979 to topple the Shah (who was weak with cancer, did not want bloodshed, and left the 
country).34 In a little over a year since the inception of  the Green Movement, it has become apparent 
that the current popular struggle is pitted against a far more repressive and violent opponent than 
the Shah. The elements are all in place, and if  the United States and allies support the will of  the 
Iranian people, then the Iranian regime will come to its demise before it gains nuclear weapons.  
The underlying reality is that the majority of  the Iranian people are unhappy with the regime 
in power and the Islamic Republic is living on borrowed time. In order to secure future interests in 
Iran, it is critical to support the long-term interests of  the Iranian people, rather than focusing on 
short-term band-aid results that will only end in a signifi cant loss of  resources and a loss of  legiti-
macy. The companies that do business with the Iranian regime now and further extend their power 
over the people are likely to be the fi rst ones ousted when the people reassert their control (circa BP 
in 1953).
It is crucial that the United States take a harsher stance in the form of  enforcing targeted sanc-
tions, garnering international support for these and other similar actions, and cutting off  the ability 
of  Iran’s elite to travel or fi nance its endeavors in the same way that South Africa was met with un-
relenting pressure from the international community to end apartheid.  This will help to secure the 
interests of  both the United States and the Iranian people, and will foster a new era for vast econom-
ic opportunities. Iran’s faltering economy and lack of  job opportunity have created a Diaspora of  
talent to the United States and Europe that could be mitigated.35 In addition, there is the issue of  the 
energy resources that Iran currently lacks the ability refi ne.  Iran is therefore consigned to a reality 
of  being one of  the most oil-rich countries in the world while still importing gasoline and other oil 
products.36 It is critical to support non-violent regime change in Iran, not only because the Islamic 
theocracy has lost any legitimate claim to sovereignty as a result of  the  widely contested election 
scandal of  2009, but also because this change would have a benefi cial ripple effect locally, regionally, 
and internationally. This positive impact especially includes an Iran that would no longer support 
terrorist organizations or bolster confl ict that promotes  discord in the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. A 
secular democracy in Iran would yield a reliable natural ally in the region whose benefi ts include the 
reduction of  hegemonic posturing, the end of  a politically tense race for nuclear weapons,
33  MDSTVUSA, CNN’s Fareed Zakaria Reports!  How Sanctions in Iran Are Working!, YOUTUBE.COM (Aug. 8, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGpICcoJKIY (explaining how sanctions are working in Iran). 
34  Background Note: Iran, supra note 18.
35  See Golnaz Esfandiari, Iran: Coping with the World’s Highest Rate of  Brain Drain, RADIO FREE EUR.:  RADIO LIBERTY 
(Mar. 8, 2004), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051803.html (showing the potential for Iran’s domestic situation 
to fl ourish were there mitigation of  the brain drain and misuse of  resources). 
36  Country Analysis Briefs:  Iran:  Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html 
(showing Iran’s vast oil and natural gas reserves) (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (noting that Iran is OPEC’s second-largest 
oil producer).  
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the normalization of  trade and economic relations, a reduction in human rights violations, and a 
signifi cant decrease in the funding and support of  terrorist organizations.  
